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RELIGION AND PUBLIC REASON  
IN THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
 





Questions about the relevance of religious views to public policy have been 
central in debates over the governance of biotechnology since the 1960s.  This 
article offers an empirical analysis of moments of deliberative politics surrounding 
human embryo research, primarily within public bioethics bodies.  I examine how 
these bodies have used the idea of public reason as developed in deliberative 
democratic theory to differentiate between secular and religious reasons.  I argue 
that scientific authority is made to play a powerful, but largely unacknowledged 
role in constructing these categories by contributing to definitions of the range of 
“reasonable” pluralism.  I show that notions of right (scientific) knowledge are co-
produced with ideas of how public discourse can be disciplined to comport with an 
ideal of public reason.  I argue that scientific authority powerfully shapes the 
contours of public deliberation in ways that are highly consequential for notions of 




As the biosciences have generated new capacities for knowing and intervening 
in life, they have also come to figure progressively more centrally on the question 
of the right relationship between the state, with its responsibility to protect life, and 
the authority of democratic society to declare what forms of life are right, desirable, 
and good.  As biotechnology comes to touch upon the deepest dimensions of human 
life, muddying boundaries between life and non-life, human and non-human, it has 
also challenged the moral and political self-understandings that undergird 
democratic institutions.  Questions about the place of religious views in public 
deliberation and policymaking have been central in debates over the governance of 
biotechnology since the 1960s.  For constitutional democracies that treat freedom of 
religion as fundamental to individual liberty and human dignity, the relevance of 
 
* J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Ph.D. is assistant professor in the School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University. 
Trained in Science and Technology Studies, his research examines the changing relationships between 
science, politics and law in the governance of biomedical research and innovation in the 20th and 
21st centuries.  He holds a Ph.D. in the History of Science from Harvard University. 
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deeply held moral and religious views for democratic approaches to protecting the 
integrity of life in its most fundamental dimensions poses a profound challenge.   
In this Article, I explore how this challenge has been approached by offering an 
empirical analysis of several moments of deliberative politics surrounding 
biotechnology.  In particular, I examine discussions of the ethics of human embryo 
research, primarily within public bioethics bodies.  I focus upon how these bodies 
have approached the question of what sorts of moral views can be appropriately 
brought to bear in processes of collective reflection and policymaking.     
Public bioethics bodies are an important element in the repertoire that states 
have developed to address challenges of governance in the biosciences.1  In the US 
context, these bodies have been charged with the task of deliberating about morally 
and technically complex questions on behalf of the wider public, with the dual aim 
of guiding wider public debate and offering advice to policymakers.  As 
apparatuses of the state that assume responsibilities on behalf of the public, these 
bodies face a basic problem of representation: how the few can legitimately claim 
to stand in for the many.  The problem is particularly acute for public bioethics 
bodies.  Members of these bodies are appointed, not elected, and they have often 
been criticized as inadequately representing the plurality of moral perspectives 
present in the wider polity.  Because these bodies are not constructed on a 
stakeholder model, they cannot claim to represent all relevant interests.  Nor can 
they straightforwardly claim the mantel of expert advisors in the sense of having 
specialized knowledge not otherwise available to the public as, for instance, a 
science advisory panel to the Environmental Protection Agency would.2  Rather, 
they are made responsible for performing the forms of moral sense-making and 
collective judgment that are the stuff of democracy itself.  
In what follows, I examine how several bodies sought to legitimate their claim 
to stand in for the public.3  I demonstrate that they drew upon two primary 
resources.  First, rather than claiming to represent the public, they claimed to 
represent public reason.  They claimed the competency to engage in the forms of 
reasoning that democracy demands, but which the politics of the public square 
could not deliver.  Second, they drew upon scientific authority to designate the 
forms of disagreement and the range of reasons that are appropriately public, as 
opposed to the nonpublic reasons that belong to the domain of private (moral and 
religious) belief.  In this analysis, I focus in particular upon two public bioethics 
bodies that mobilized ideas from deliberative democratic theory to define the 
 
1 SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED 
STATES (2005). 
2 Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 186 (Jon Elster ed., 
1998). The ambiguous role of public bioethics is underscored by the fact that representation in regulatory 
science is itself a complex matter.  Cf. SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS 
POLICYMAKERS (1998). 
3 My analysis is based on an extensive study of the debates over human embryo research.  I conducted 
an extensive documentary analysis, including analyzing the full transcripts of all of the meetings of the 
bioethics bodies, publications produced by the bodies and by individual members, as well as transcripts of 
congressional and other public hearings, other published materials, government documents, public media 
reports, and much more.  I also conducted several dozen interviews with central figures in these debates, 
including a number of individuals who served as members of these bodies or on their staff. 
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parameters of legitimately democratic deliberation.  One of my aims is to examine 
how these ideas function “in the wild” when deployed as regulative concepts to 
discipline political discourse into public reason.  I show that in constructing ideas of 
public reason, they relied upon the epistemic authority of science, and in particular 
the uncritical presumption in American political culture that knowledge stands 
outside of politics.  I show that scientific judgments were placed in asymmetrical 
relation with public concerns, with the former placing constraints upon the latter.  
At the same time, this dynamic was occluded by an idealized construction of 
democratic deliberation that at once relies upon the authority of science to be 
reasonable, and denies that science is inside the fold of politics.  Put differently, to 
produce conditions of apparently “free public reasoning among equals,”4 scientific 
authority was empowered to define the limits of public reason, and thus to declare 
the conditions under which deliberation is free and participants equal.  Behind this 
was an imaginary, powerful in American political culture, that there is an 
asymmetry between science and politics.  Science is univocal whereas politics is 
fragmented; science’s reasons are universal, whereas democracy is burdened with 
the fact of pluralism.  Within this imaginary, science enjoys a privileged position in 
distinguishing between the reasonable and the unreasonable, particularly between 
(secular) public reasons and (religious) nonpublic ones.  Science is seen as 
supplying notions of what is common, and thus what should be held to be common 
among those abiding by the norms of public reason.    
Importantly, the controversial issue in this case, human embryo research, was a 
site of “ontological politics,” where ontological and normative dimensions of a 
biological entity or phenomenon are simultaneously contested, and ethical concepts 
are subject to processes of ontological clarification, and vice versa.5  (Arguably, 
most “ethical” problems in the biosciences fit this description.)  In moments of 
ontological politics, distinctions between scientific and ethical questions, between 
what are matters of fact and what are issues of values, are therefore neither self-
evident nor given in advance.  Rather, when issues are clarified or disagreement is 
settled, these distinctions are consequences, rather than causes of these processes.  
One of the foundational observations in the sociology of scientific knowledge 
is that facts do not settle controversy, but controversy settles facts.  That is, the 
stabilization of epistemic claims is arrived at through social processes that are not 
themselves explained by reference to the veracity of the epistemic claims they 
produce.  David Bloor’s principle of symmetry elevated this insight to a rule of 
method: social analysis of knowledge-making should treat the production of claims 
that are held to be true (i.e., credible) and those that are to be false (i.e., incredible) 
symmetrically. 6  With the concept of coproduction, Sheila Jasanoff has applied this 
principle beyond narrow arenas of technical practice to interrogate the mutual 
constitution of knowledge and norms—of epistemic and normative configurations 
 
4 Cohen, supra note 2, at 186. 
5 REFRAMING RIGHTS: BIOCONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE GENETIC AGE 293–94 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 
2011). 
6 DAVID BLOOR, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL IMAGERY (1st ed. 1976); see also BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE 
IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY (1987). 
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of rightness—at the nexus of science and politics.7  Here I am building upon this 
scholarship to analyze the coproduction of constructions of science and democracy 
as the respective institutional custodians of facts and values, and in particular, the 
ways science is drawn upon to construct a public/private distinction by marking 
particular kinds of reasons as religious. 
The demarcations between facts and values, scientific claims and moral 
judgments, premises held in common and personal (religious) beliefs are not given 
in advance.  Notions of the secular and the religious are deployed to construct the 
boundaries of acceptable public reason.  I show that notions of knowledge, and thus 
of scientific authority, are coproduced with ideas of public reason.  Science is used 
to mark certain reasons as falling into the category of “the religious,” and thus out 
of the category of acceptable public reasons.  I trace three primary moves whereby 
bioethics bodies have deployed science to define ethical problems and delineate the 
scope of public reasoning: first, by intervening in moments of ontological politics 
by making ontological declarations that delimit the scope of (reasonable) ethical 
deliberation; second, by serving as exemplar of the kind of reasoning appropriate to 
public deliberation; and third, by defining the limits of reasonable moral concern by 
declaring the (im)plausibility of possible futures. 
In the first section of the article, I briefly discuss the dimensions of deliberative 
democratic theory that are relevant to my analysis.  In the second section, I explain 
my rationale for taking bioethics as a locus of empirical study.  In the third section, 
I contextualize the cases by offering a brief history of the debates surrounding 
human embryo research, including a brief discussion of one bioethics body.  In the 
fourth and fifth sections, I discuss the two cases that are the main focus of my 




The question of what sorts of moral views can be appropriately brought to bear 
in processes of collective reflection and policymaking, and thus what sorts of 
reasoning are appropriate to public deliberation, is a longstanding problem in 
democratic theory.  Never a simple problem, it is rendered all the more challenging 
given that the new biotechnologies touch upon fundamental dimensions of human 
life where the ethical stakes are not easily dissociated from profoundly personal, 
religious, and moral commitments.  Yet on its surface, this challenge is a familiar 
one, since the ways in which the private moral lives of citizens should or should not 
figure in the collective lives of democratic societies is a well-worn problem in 
liberal theory.  This is the perennial problem of the place of moral and religious 
views in the public discourse of secular societies that have made a dual 
commitment to protecting the prerogative of citizens to hold such views, and to 
preventing public institutions from privileging any one view over others.  
 
7 Sheila Jasanoff, The Idiom of Co-Production, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF 
SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 1 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2004); see also SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AND 
PUBLIC REASON (2012). 
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This issue has figured centrally in lines of deliberative democratic theory that 
trace their genealogies back to the work of John Rawls.  Here, I offer an (extremely 
incomplete) sketch of some of the basic concepts and approaches relevant to my 
analysis that theorists of deliberative democracy have developed.  This sketch is 
not, and is not intended to be, comprehensive.  As a synopsis of ideas, it is 
incomplete and bound to be untrue to the careful philosophical work of scholars in 
this area.  However, my intention is not to engage with this theoretical work on its 
own turf, but rather to examine the social life of these ideas as they are integrated 
into spaces of practice.  I understand these ideas as already embedded in a particular 
political culture and associated imaginaries.  They give articulation to an 
imagination of the right ordering of things that is already around in culture, but 
which through theoretical codification is rendered more powerful in shaping 
thought and practice.  
Deliberative democratic theorists in the Rawlsian tradition note the “fact of 
reasonable pluralism,” that plural, irreconcilable “comprehensive doctrines” are 
inevitably held by members of a political community.  This poses a challenge for 
collective political judgment, particularly where the aspiration is to arrive at 
political positions that neither merely aggregate individual preferences nor are 
simply majoritarian.  Deliberative democrats in the Rawlsian tradition see 
significant limitations in aggregative democracy.  It supplies a weak foundation for 
political legitimacy.  Deliberation offers a superior solution.   
“According to a deliberative conception, a decision is collective just in case it 
emerges from arrangements of binding collective choice that establish conditions of 
free public reasoning among equals who are governed by the decisions.”8  Thus, 
the idea of deliberative democracy is “to tie the exercise of power to conditions of 
public reasoning[] . . . .”9 
The idea of public reason is an attempt to locate political legitimacy in 
deliberation without running afoul of the fact of reasonable pluralism.  To radically 
over-simplify, Rawls’ idea of public reason requires that citizens provide 
justifications that all other citizens will find reasonable “by appealing to beliefs, 
grounds, and political values it is reasonable for others also to acknowledge,” even 
if they disagree with those reasons.10  Under ideal conditions, everyone will be 
convinced by the best reasons.  But in the real world people will disagree, so 
everyone must use reasons that seem at least reasonable to everyone else, if not 
convincing.  This is the principle of reciprocity.  It requires that “[w]hen citizens 
make moral claims in a deliberative democracy, they appeal to reasons or principles 
that can be shared by fellow citizens . . . .”11   Nonpublic reasons are inappropriate 
to public reasoning because they do not comport with shared conceptions of 
reasonableness: 
[S]hared guidelines for inquiry and methods of reasoning make that 
 
8 Cohen, supra note 2, at 186 (emphasis in original). 
9 Id. 
10 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 27 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). 
11 AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 55 (1996). 
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reason public, while freedom of speech and thought in a constitutional 
regime make that reason free.  By contrast, nonpublic reason is the 
reason appropriate to individuals and associations within society: it 
guides how they quite properly deliberate in making their personal and 
associational decisions.12 
Rawls positions public reason as a constitutional essential.  A stable 
constitutional regime “should specify not only a shared but if possible a clear basis 
of public reason, and one that can publicly be seen to be sufficiently reliable in its 
own terms.”13  Political values, particularly those that touch upon constitutional 
essentials, must conform to the requirements of public reason which “bar 
theological and other comprehensive doctrines from deciding the case.”14  Thus, 
public reason is a regulative concept.  It is a duty of citizenship that participants in a 
political community offer public reasons when engaged in political deliberation.  
Public reason, in effect, defines the terms of participation.  In theory, it is a 
normative prerequisite for enacting deliberative democracy in practice.  In practice, 
however, it plays a disciplinary function in delimiting the rules of participation in a 
political community.  On some level, this is an intended feature of the idea.  It is 
meant to shape the practices of a political culture in such a way that that political 
culture incorporates those practices as norms.  Indeed, it is intended to play a kind 
of pedagogical role in shaping members of the political community.  In limiting the 
kinds of reasons that can be given in political deliberation, “public reasoning itself 
can help to reduce the diversity of politically relevant preferences because such 
preferences are shaped and even formed in the process of public reasoning itself.”15   
 My primary concern in this article is the relationship between scientific 
authority and normative constructions of public reason that play a regulative 
function in practices of governance.  Knowledge occupies a profound but neglected 
role in shaping public reason.  Later I demonstrate this through empirical analysis.  
But it is worth observing the constitutive (even constitutional) role that scientific 
authority plays in Rawls’ conception of public reason:  
Faced with the fact of reasonable pluralism, and granted that, on matters 
of constitutional essentials, basic institutions and public policies should 
be justifiable to all citizens (as the liberal principle of legitimacy 
requires), we allow the parties the general beliefs and forms of reasoning 
found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science, 
when not controversial. . . . So we say the parties have that kind of 
general knowledge and they use those ways of reasoning.  This excludes 
comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines (the whole truth as 
it were) from being specified as public reasons.16  
 
12 RAWLS, supra note 10, at 92. 
13 Id. at 116. 
14 Id. at 117. 
15 Cohen, supra note 2, at 199 (emphasis omitted). 
16 RAWLS, supra note 10, at 89–90. 
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On this account, the “methods and conclusions of science” occupy a special 
category of reasons: reasons that citizens cannot evaluate for themselves, but must 
accept as reasonable.  Seen as an epistemological abstraction, scientific knowledge 
is secured not by its reasonableness for citizens, but in its correspondence to nature.  
But as the product of a social process, knowledge is the product of a community of 
reason whose reasons are not (on Rawls’ account) answerable to public reason.  
Admittedly, “when not controversial” could be interpreted to mean “when not 
controversial in the judgment of the political community.”  But in practice (and in 
my understanding of Rawls’ intended meaning), the scientific community is seen as 
the relevant community of reason for judging what conclusions of science are 
(un)controversial.  The idea of public reason as an obligation of citizens to provide 
and respond to reasons in terms of “beliefs, grounds, and political values [that] it is 
reasonable for others also to acknowledge” places science and citizens in 
asymmetrical relation in the space of public reason.17  That which is marked (by 
scientific authority) as uncontroverted knowledge is de facto reasonable, whereas 
those views that are marked as religious (potentially, as we shall see below, by 
invoking scientific authority to reject critical challenges to science’s ontological 
accounts) are de facto excluded.  Importantly, this privileged position of science is 
not an unbidden intrusion of technocracy into political space of the sort that Jürgen 
Habermas has worried about.18  Rather, it is delegated by democracy to science.  It 
is not colonization, but deference.19   
 Joshua Cohen argues that the idea of public reason offers a model for designing 
institutionalized power to comport with a deliberative ideal.  “We can work out the 
content of the deliberative democratic ideal and its conception of public reasoning 
by considering features of such reasoning in the idealized case and then aiming to 
build those features into institutions.”20  The bioethics bodies that I analyze below 
attempted to do precisely this.  They positioned themselves as addressing the “fact 
of reasonable pluralism” by bridging that chasm that separates the imaginary world 




 In the next section, I discuss the attempts of public bioethics bodies to navigate 
the “fact of reasonable pluralism” by constructing the parameters of public reason.  
I examine the actual practices of reasoning undertaken in the name of a democratic 
public, and in institutional contexts authorized to do so.  My aim is not to hold 
those practices up against an idealized normative construct in order to evaluate 
whether or not they approximate the ideal.  Rather, I am interested in how such 
ideal constructions function as ingredients in practice, and in particular how, as 
 
17 Id. at 27 (emphasis added). 
18 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY: STUDENT PROTEST, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS 
(Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 1987). 
19 J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Remembering the Future: Science, Law, and the Legacy of Asilomar, in 
DREAMSCAPES OF MODERNITY: SOCIOTECHICAL IMAGINARIES AND THE FABRICATION OF POWER 126–50 
(Sheila Jasanoff & Sang-Hyun Kim eds., forthcoming Aug. 2015). 
20 Cohen, supra note 2, at 193. 
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aspirational ideals, they come to configure the practices of the institutions that 
employ them.  However, before moving on to this empirical material, I offer a brief 
rationale for selecting bioethics as an object of study. 
As societies have come to confront new challenges of governance at the nexus 
of science and democracy, they have generated new practices and institutions of 
governance to address them.  These institutions are not merely (or even primarily) 
shaped by the problems they confront, but also by the ways in which these 
problems are constructed as problems—of knowledge, of risk, of violating 
fundamental moral boundaries, etc.  This, in turn, reflects imaginations of the 
responsibilities of institutions of governance, and of the right relationships between 
science, the state and its citizens.  The domain of bioethics is one critical area in 
which such imaginations have been engaged and shaped, though often without 
explicit acknowledgement or clear recognition that this is happening.  As I discuss 
below, the idea of public reason advanced in deliberative democratic theory is part 
of the repertoire of approaches that public bioethics bodies have drawn upon in 
identifying ethical problems and envisioning adequate responses to them.  Bioethics 
tends to see these moments in terms of the ethically problematic technologies that 
define them.  But the last several decades has seen extraordinary change not just in 
science and technology, but in our moral and political engagements with them.  
These modes of engagement have developed over time and across multiple 
technical domains, though these systemic continuities are obscured by the reactive 
proliferation of technology specific subfields like “genethics,” “neuroethics,” 
“synbioethics,” etc.  Furthermore, they are not only intellectual approaches, but also 
institutionalized regimes of “oversight,” authorized to engage in reasoning and 
judgment on behalf of the rest of us.  (Embryonic Stem Cell research oversight 
committees are one example of many.)21  Because bioethics is a consequential part 
of the landscape of contemporary governance, we ought to understand how it has 
come to be, and how it carries out its business. 
However, beyond watching the watchers for the sake of democratic 
accountability, there is much to be learned about how societies imagine 
responsibilities of governance by examining these institutions.  They are, in effect, 
sites of democratic experimentation in the governance of science and technology.  
As such, their practices illuminate not only how we contend with developments in 
science and technology, but how democracy itself is re-imagined in the process.22  I 
focus here on public bioethics bodies because they are sites where the abstractions 
of moral and political theory touch down in arenas of public controversy.  Here, the 
idealized constructs of democratic theory are put to the test, but they are also 
deployed to set the terms of the test—to discipline the politics of deliberation to 
conform with particular notions of order and reasonableness.  Whether and how 
these notions hold offers insight into the political culture that accepts or rejects 
 
21 J. Benjamin Hurlbut & Jason Scott Robert, Good Governance Connects Science and Society, 31 J. 
POL’Y ANAL. & MGMT. 706, 722–26 (2012); J. Benjamin Hurlbut & Jason Scott Robert, Stem Cells, Science 
and Public Reasoning, 31 J. POL’Y ANAL. & MGMT. 706, 707–14 (2012); Sheila Jasanoff, Making the Facts 
of Life, in REFRAMING RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 59.  
22 J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Reimagining Responsibility in Synthetic Biology, J. RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION 
1–4 (2015).  
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them.  These experiments reveal a particular “unthought” in culturally powerful 
notions of reason, pluralism and democracy.23  Problems of knowledge and of 
epistemic authority—of what is known, who knows, and what ontological accounts 
hold sway—are bound up with ideas of democracy, with normative notions of the 
modes of deliberation and the forms of reasoning that make democratic processes 
legitimate, yet in ways that go effectively unnoticed by students of political theory.  
Finally, these are sites of secularization in which notions of the secular and 
religious are constructed and deployed to regulate reasoning.  Religious and moral 
pluralism figures centrally in moments where⎯science and technology touch upon 
fundamental dimensions of human life.  It is present as a “fact” of civil society and 
a figure in public discourse, but also as a foundational constitutional imaginary in 
American political culture.  Recently, scholars have begun to attend to “formations 
of the secular,”24 sites where the figures of religion, politics and secular reason have 
been constructed and rendered constitutive features of modernity.  As Jose 
Casanova has observed, “the secular has become a central modern concept—
theological-philosophical, legal-political, and cultural-anthropological—to 
construct, codify, grasp and experience a realm or reality differentiated from ‘the 
religious.’”25  This line of scholarship rejects the thesis that secularization is an 
inevitable and teleological feature of modernization, and takes the secular itself as 
an object of interrogation.  Remarkably, science has been largely neglected as a 
space in which formations of the secular take shape.26  It has generally been treated 
as a kind of autonomous institution, injecting its products of knowledge, technique 
and worldview into a separate public sphere of meaning and moral imagination.  
Yet science is a social institution whose fingerprints are all over the basic normative 
repertoire of modern political order, for instance, as a source of legitimacy for the 
state,27 as an exemplar of democracy,28 as an originator of imaginaries of progress 
and transcendence,29 and, as I argue below, as a resource in delineating the 
boundaries between public (secular) and private (religious) modes of reasoning.  
Science is one of modernity’s most powerful sites of authority, and has played a 
constitutive role in the formation of secular imaginations of moral and political 
 
23 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 322–30 
(1994). 
24 TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY (2003). 
25 Jose Casanova, The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms, in RETHINKING SECULARISM 54–74 (Craig 
Calhoun et al. eds., 2011). 
26 One possible symptom of this neglect is the fact that “science” does not appear in the index of Charles 
Taylor’s groundbreaking text in this area.  It does appear well over a hundred times in the text itself, though 
only as the self-contained locus of particular intellectual and institutional changes that mark (or cause) the 
emergence of modernity.   But science (and technology) are not merely ingredients in the making of the 
secular age, but are integrated into it, and are products of it.  Taylor’s important turn from a history of ideas to 
a history of imagination-in-practice overlooks the extent to which modernity’s most powerful social 
imaginaries are, in fact, sociotechnical imaginaries.  CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007); on 
sociotechnical imaginaries, see DREAMSCAPES OF MODERNITY: SOCIOTECHICAL IMAGINARIES AND THE 
FABRICATION OF POWER, supra note 19.  
27 YARON EZRAHI, THE DESCENT OF ICARUS  : SCIENCE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY (1990). 
28 Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1 MINERVA 54 (1962); 
Alvin M. Weinberg, The Obligations of Citizenship in the Republic of Science, 16 MINERVA 1 (1978). 
29 DREAMSCAPES OF MODERNITY: SOCIOTECHICAL IMAGINARIES AND THE FABRICATION OF POWER, 
supra note 19. 
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order.30  As Calhoun et al. observe, “the demarcation between the religious and the 
secular is made, not simply found.”31  Rethinking secularism requires also attending 




By way of background, it is worth briefly reviewing the history of human 
embryo research and uses of human in vitro fertilization.  During the 1980s, there 
was a dramatic increase in assisted reproduction involving in vitro fertilization 
(“IVF”) in the United States.  Louise Brown, the first child conceived through IVF 
was born in the U.K. in 1978.  The first American baby conceived through IVF was 
born in December, 1981.  In 1996, when the Centers for Disease Control began 
collecting data, roughly 1 in 200 babies born in the United States were conceived in 
vitro.  As of 2012, the rate was roughly 1.5% of live births.32   
In contrast to most European countries, IVF in the United States has been left 
largely unregulated at the national level.  In the 1980s, the US federal government 
invested no public funds in either research or clinical applications of human in vitro 
fertilization, and therefore exerted no regulatory control over research practices.  
The US Food and Drug Administration did not regulate IVF.  In general, private 
insurance did not cover IVF, and therefore it was not subject to the insurance 
industry’s quasi-regulatory power over medical practices.  Instead, IVF emerged as 
a purely private sector practice and a consumer good for those who could afford its 
high price tag.  By the mid-1980s, efforts had emerged within the American 
Fertility Society to subject the IVF industry to certain criteria of accreditation and 
standards.  However, this self-regulatory effort was slow in developing and 
relatively weak once it did emerge.  Because it lacked the force of law, adherence 
by IVF clinics was voluntary and, therefore, incomplete.  Given this unconstrained 
environment, a significant market for IVF services, and the lucrative nature of the 
business, a large IVF industry emerged rapidly in the early to mid-1980s.  When 
Congress turned its attention to it in the late 1980s, it confronted an already existing 
industry, with an established market, established consumer expectations, and 
existing (though voluntary) industry rules and norms.  Thus, Congress approached 
regulation primarily as a matter of consumer protection.  When legislation was 
finally passed in 1992, it provided only for collection of data on clinics’ success 
rates so that consumers could make informed choices about where to seek services.  
In an environment of market competition, clinics sought an advantage by achieving 
higher rates of live births than their competitors.  As a result, US clinics tended to 
produce, transfer and cryopreserve more embryos than was permissible in much of 
Europe. 
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CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://nccd.cdc.gov/DRH_ART/Apps/NationalSummaryReport.aspx (last visited 
Aug 14, 2014). 
2015] RELIGION AND PUBLIC REASON IN THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 111 
One consequence of these practices was that by the early 1990s, there were a 
large number of cryopreserved IVF embryos that had been produced by infertile 
couples in an effort to get pregnant, but were no longer needed for that purpose.  
Proponents of research saw these so-called spare frozen embryos as a vast natural 
resource that could be put to good use as research material.  For research conducted 
in the private sector, nothing prevented the use of spare embryos in this way—or, 
for that matter, the creation of embryos specifically for research purposes.  But 
given the enormous federal budget allocated to biomedical research in the United 
States, and the fact that academic researchers rely almost exclusively upon National 
Institutes of Health (“NIH”) funding, the de facto ineligibility of human embryo 
research for federal support was seen as a significant impediment.    
Public ethical debate about in vitro fertilization stretched back decades, 
arguably all the way back to the mid-1920s when J.B.S. Haldane imagined a future 
in which reproduction was a technologically mediated process.33  As IVF became 
technically realistic, it came to figure in imaginations of human biological self-
transformation, and emerging discussions about the responsibility to control and 
shape the human future.34  The primary participants in these discussions were 
scientists (often quite prominent ones) and theologians.35  The conversations were 
not organized around specific technologies so much as the notions of human 
purpose that would guide emerging forms of biological control.  Thus, technologies 
like IVF were seen as worrisome in their own right, but also as emblematic of a 
posture toward human life that would subject it to unprecedented technological 
control.  This is evident in the title of a 1972 Journal of the American Medical 
Association editorial about in vitro fertilization entitled “Genetic Engineering in 
Man.”36  A decade later, IVF technology had become increasingly distanced from 
the notion of radical control.  It was, of course, widely recognized that it could be 
utilized for these purposes, but by 1980, the reigning presumption was that, with the 
right limits, it should be seen more as an extension (or medical facilitation) of a 
natural process than as a radical break with nature.   
 From the end of the 1970s forward, American lines of debate fell into three 
rough categories.  First, there was a reproductive rights frame.  Some argued that 
the line of constitutional interpretation that had culminated in Roe v. Wade in 1973 
clearly drew a boundary around reproduction as an intimate, private space in which 
the state could not interfere.  Thus, if considerations of safety could be set aside—
and they were set aside remarkably quickly—IVF could be treated as a medical 
procedure that was between a woman and her doctor, and could be assimilated into 
an established medico-legal order without further collective evaluation.  Though 
there certainly were ethical questions to be asked, they too were in the space of 
individual liberty and judgment.  This line of argument was an important element in 
the approach that was adopted by the Ethics Advisory Board (“EAB”) in 1979, the 
first ethics body in the United States (and, for that matter, the world) to deliberate 
 
33 J. B. S. HALDANE, DAEDALUS OR SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE (1924). 
34 See, e.g., MAN AND HIS FUTURE (Gordon Wolstenholme ed. 1963).  
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about IVF.  This (extra-juridical) interpretation of the law in effect privatized the 
moral questions associated with this process.37  
 The second framing tended to treat the embryo as a key element in a process of 
procreation that could be understood more or less as a technological reconstitution 
of a natural biological process.  Questions about how to treat the embryo tended to 
be framed as a problem of naturalization: of the extent to which laboratory 
interventions recapitulated or broke with natural procreation.  Concerns about the 
mechanization and commoditization of procreation focused on IVF’s potential for 
departure from the script of natural reproduction to produce new configurations of 
biological, legal, economic and cultural relationships between procreative partners, 
parents and children.  These discussions also evaluated the experimental 
appropriation of biological potencies for laboratory ends by examining the degree 
to which experiments represented a break with natural processes.  For instance, if a 
certain percentage of embryos would be lost in natural reproduction, then using 
experimental techniques in IVF that did not increase this rate might be permissible.  
Put simply, this line of discussion focused on the perturbations to traditional 
configurations of biological, social and moral relations that these technologies 
heralded, and looked to nature as a normative touchstone and precedent.  Where 
practices were more analogous to nature, they seemed to demand less ethical 
justification; where less analogous, they demanded more.   
 A third ethical frame that emerged during this period was over the “moral 
status” of the human embryo.  This frame specifically acknowledged the potential 
for separating the embryo from a reproductive process, and thus took it as an 
abstract object of ontological and moral assessment in itself.  On some level, this 
line of discussion tracked the new figure of the in vitro embryo as an object in a 
dish.  Abstracted from the embodied process of procreation, the in vitro human 
embryo could be visualized, discussed and governed as an autonomous entity.  
Indeed the generic, discursive figure of “the embryo” emerged in discussions of 
moral status.  The embryo became a decontextualized object of moral reflection as 
the procreative purpose of IVF faded into the background. 
Discussions of moral status emerged most forcefully around questions of 
whether IVF embryos could be taken as objects of pure research.  Rather than 
examine particular experimental uses, this line of debate first sought a principled 
answer about the embryo itself, which could then be the basis for more or less 
permissive research policies.  In effect, the wide range of imagined uses of the 
embryo focused conversation on a narrow moral-ontological assessment of what it 
is in itself.  The prospect of using the embryo as an experimental object informed 
how it was approached as a moral subject.  
The “moral status” of the human embryo had figured centrally in ethical 
deliberations since the late 1970s.  In 1978, the first public bioethics body to assess 
IVF, the Ethics Advisory Board, had faced the question of whether the human 
embryo ought to be treated as a human subject, and thus afforded the protections 
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that were in the same year being articulated by the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Behavioral and Biomedical research in what came 
to be known as the Belmont Report.  For the Ethics Advisory Board (“EAB”), the 
issue of moral status came to be informed by an ontological assessment of the 
human embryo.  The Board asked whether the moral judgment that the embryo 
should be treated as a human person made sense in light of its biological attributes.  
This approach took shape largely under the influence of the natural law inflected 
sensibilities of the Jesuit theologian and moral philosopher Richard McCormick. 
Interestingly, in this respect the EAB’s approach represented a departure from 
the National Commission’s 1975 evaluation of fetal research.  The National 
Commission opted not to address the question of when morally significant human 
life begins.  Instead, it treated the human fetus as a human subject like any other, 
regardless of its developmental stage.  However, when the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (“DHEW”) promulgated regulations governing fetal 
research, the fetus was defined as including the human embryo from implantation 
forward (roughly fourteen days post-fertilization).  By DHEW’s own account, this 
was a purely pragmatic distinction: because the technology of the day could not 
detect the presence of the conceptus in vivo prior to implantation, a definition that 
embraced the preimplantation embryo would be unenforceable.38  The EAB 
assessment of research on the human embryo addressed precisely this ungoverned 
interval of fourteen days.  In its recommendations, it drew a bright line at fourteen 
days not because there was consensus that it represented a morally significant 
moment of ontological transformation, but because less or more would have 
required a principled reevaluation of the existing regulations.  In this sense, the 
boundary was initially somewhat arbitrary. 
 From the beginning of these discussions, questions of moral status were seen as 
turning in important ways on the embryo’s biological status.  Thus, arguments 
about how the embryo should be treated transmuted into questions of how it should 
be known and described, and of what knowledge of biological features of the 
embryo could clarify, or even resolve, moral questions.  Proponents of the view that 
the embryo did not rise to the moral status of a more developmentally advanced 
human being tended to point to two biological factors.  First, prior to gastrulation 
(roughly fourteen days after fertilization), an embryo can cleave, splitting into two 
embryos.  (This is the process that gives rise to monozygotic twins.)  Second, 
humans have a high rate of embryo loss.  A significant number of fertilizations do 
not progress past the relatively early stages of development.  Thus the odds of any 
given embryo progressing beyond early development are less than half.  Some took 
these biological accounts to show that the early embryo did not rise to the level of a 
 
38 For the definition of “fetus” and “pregnancy” in the regulations promulgated in light of the National 
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full, human moral subject.39  These have become well-worn arguments in the last 
thirty-five years.  They are widely invoked and often challenged.40  
 For my present purposes, I am less interested in the merits of those arguments 
themselves than in how they were used to define the limits of publicly reasonable 
moral concern.  In 1985, the ethics committee of the American Fertility Society 
pointed to these biological features of the embryo to argue that the philosophical 
concept of personhood could not reasonably attach to the early human conceptus 
because it simply did not meet the basic ontological criterion of being an individual.  
The committee argued that because the early embryo can twin, it is scientifically 
incorrect to consider it an individual.  And because persons are necessarily 
individuals, it is therefore philosophically incoherent to consider it a person, at least 
where moral judgments give due deference to scientific knowledge.  As the author 
of this section of the committee report had put it elsewhere, such a purely scientific 
account would not satisfy “individuals committed to a religious view of the matter,” 
but the purpose of public deliberation and policymaking was not to address private 
religious concerns.41 
 The committee went so far as to coin a new term to distinguish between the 
pre- and post-fourteen day embryo: the preembryo. The committee made clear that 
this new nomenclature was strictly scientific.  It was “not intended to imply a moral 
evaluation of the embryo.”42  The purpose of the term, according to the committee, 
was to introduce descriptive accuracy into public debate, thereby disciplining public 
discourse to take into account relevant facts.  The committee believed the public 
was concerned about IVF because it was confusing the preembryo with later 
developmental stages.  Thus, the committee hoped the new term would establish a 
clear line between an entity of limited moral concern⎯the preembryo⎯and an 
entity of greater moral status⎯the embryo⎯and thus eliminate ethical objections to 
embryo research.  The committee hoped that by using these terms, the public would 
incorporate an important scientific distinction into moral debate without actually 
needing to know what facts lay behind the language.  The term would be both 
“scientifically accurate and meaningful to the public.”43  By using a scientifically 
authorized distinction, the public could delegate responsibility for knowing the facts 
to experts.  It would also make clear the difference between “religious views of the 
matter” by revealing them to be at ontological odds with biological reality.  The 
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“preembryo” would make certain biological facts public, while exposing certain 
moral arguments as religious and therefore necessarily nonpublic.   
What is of interest for my purposes is not the question of whether the concept 
of the preembryo was a factual representation of nature or a value-laden 
construction masquerading as a fact, though critics of the term pilloried it as the 
latter.  Rather, I wish to draw attention to the tacit democratic theory that was 
behind it: facts always provide a crucial common ground and, therefore, should 
precede and constrain values-questions.  The concept of the preembryo encoded a 
vision of democratic deliberation in which scientific experts step in to ensure that 
the terms of ethical deliberation comport with the relevant facts.  Science provides 
the correct classifications and democracy sorts out their moral significance, if any. 
This technocratic notion of the place of science in politics is a familiar one.  (As I 
suggested above, it is arguably a tacit, if not explicit ingredient in Rawls’ idea of 
public reason).  It reflects the idiom of the science-politics distinction in American 
political life.  Is a scientific claim pure or politicized?  Though this question is 
meant to challenge the credibility of a particular claim, it simultaneously affirms 
that pure scientific knowledge legitimately precedes and informs values questions. 
On this view, democratic questions of “what shall we do” should defer to scientific 
declarations of what is the case. 
The deliberations of the AFS ethics committee nicely capture what one might 
call the constitutional position of science—that is, the privileged position of science 
in configuring normative arrangements through the authority to define the nature of 
the world to which norms apply, and to demand reformation of norms where they 
fail to comport with that world.44  However, although the committee’s approach 
was informed by a notion of how scientific knowledge ought to inform public 
deliberation, it did not ground this notion in an explicit account of public reason.  
Thus, while the preembryo was intended to exclude certain particular (ostensibly) 
religious reasons, it did not attempt to define the norms whereby one would identify 
and exclude nonpublic reasons.  However, the bodies discussed in the next two 
sections did precisely this, and they relied upon the constitutional position of 




In this section I discuss is the Human Embryo Research Panel (“HERP”).  The 
HERP was constituted in 1993 by the director of the National Institutes of Health 
(“NIH”) to explore ethical dimensions of the use of human embryos in NIH-funded 
research.  NIH had never funded such research.  Since 1975, it had been subject to a 
regulation that required that any protocol involving human embryo research be 
subjected to review by the Ethics Advisory Board (“EAB”).  Though the Board was 
created in 1977, it was dissolved at the end of the Carter administration, and was 
not reconstituted.  As a result, there was a de facto moratorium on human embryo 
research in place from 1980 to 1993.  In June 1993, Congress passed legislation that 
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nullified that longstanding regulatory requirement.45  The elimination of the 
requirement for EAB review was interpreted by the National Institutes of Health as 
opening the door to all forms of research on human embryos in vitro.  Though there 
was no longer a regulatory requirement for ethical review, the NIH director Harold 
Varmus decided that research on the human embryo was sufficiently sensitive that 
an advisory body should be constituted to address ethical questions before any 
research proposals were approved.  The HERP was assembled to study the issues 
and provide a report to the Advisory Committee to the Director.  On February 2, 
1994, the Panel held its first meeting. 
Like other bioethics bodies that preceded it, the Panel was composed of a 
variety of different types of experts.  It was composed of nineteen members, 
representing a range of disciplines including embryology, reproductive medicine, 
law, bioethics, sociology, and patient advocacy.  Several of the members were 
intimately familiar with the ethical complexities associated with human embryo 
research.  For instance, Mark Hughes was a pioneering researcher on human 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis and held a position at NIH.  The Panel’s charge 
was to ethically evaluate research on the extracorporeal human embryo.  It was to 
categorize research activities into three classes, those that were acceptable for 
federal funding, those warranting further review, and those that were unacceptable 
for federal funding.  The Panel held five meetings between February and June of 
1994.  The Report of the Human Embryo Research Panel was reviewed and 
endorsed by the Advisory Committee to the Director on December 2, 1994, and 
publicly released the same day. 
The panel’s deliberations came at a crucial, transitional moment in the history 
of cell biology.  More than a decade of research had taken place since the derivation 
of embryonic stem cells from mouse embryos in 1981.46  With new techniques in 
cell culture and genetics, there was significant interest amongst developmental 
biologists in studying human embryogenesis and cellular differentiation, with 
corollary hope that these techniques might lead to new understandings of—and 
therapeutic interventions in—human disease.  Researchers saw human embryos as a 
powerful resource for these purposes.  In this imagination, the in vitro human 
embryo was no longer circumscribed to the project of procreation.  While clinical 
IVF formed important background infrastructure for this vision, it was as a source 
of embryos, and no longer the sole context in which in vitro embryos might be put 
to research use.  The large surplus of embryos (and, potentially, gametes) that had 
been generated within the private space of assisted reproduction could be allowed to 
spill over into the domain of public science.  Thus, the HERP approached the 
embryo as a potential research object, not as an element in a process of procreation.  
Though many of the imagined applications of embryo research were related to 
reproduction (and contraception), the HERP focused on the potential value of the 
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human embryo for research on cancer, toxicology, and as a potential source of 
human embryonic stem cells.  Indeed, some Panel members saw the HERP as a 
critical vehicle for opening up a fundamental, potentially revolutionary domain of 
human biological research, and lending it the legitimacy of American academic 
science.  As one member put it, the Panel would help to shift authority over embryo 
research into the jurisdiction of the scientific community—to “return this research 
to peer-review.” 47   
Despite its broad charge, the HERP made an evaluation of the moral status of 
the human embryo the centerpiece of its deliberations.  Its members assumed that if 
they could locate the embryo in the appropriate category of moral worth, the 
(im)permissibility of its uses would follow.  The Panel zeroed in on questions of 
moral and ontological status almost immediately.  In the first hour of the first 
meeting, during a very preliminary discussion of the Panel’s charge, Chairman 
Steven Muller asked for a “working definition of an embryo.”  Duane Alexander, 
the director of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, who 
was present at the meeting to welcome the members, directed Muller to the Panel’s 
briefing materials.  The glossary defined the embryo as “the developing human 
from about two weeks after fertilization until the end of the eighth week.”  That 
definition was, according to Alexander, “pretty much a standard one.”  Other Panel 
members disagreed, maintaining that the term refers to the conceptus from 
fertilization forward.  Within moments, the Panel was already engaged in a 
discussion of the significance of gastrulation, twinning, and the formation of a body 
axis for the definition of the embryo, as well as the biological, social and legal 
significance of these developmental markers.48 
The Panel generally accepted the AFS Committee’s conclusions about the 
preembryo: gastrulation was both a biological and morally significant marker; the 
primitive streak was a line drawn by nature that should also be drawn in law.  But 
for HERP, unlike for the AFS committee, this was couched as a normative 
judgment, not a scientific one.  Whereas the AFS committee had made a direct leap 
from biological status to moral status, for the Panel, this step was grounded in an 
account of public reason.  The Panel concluded that gastrulation was a morally 
significant marker not simply because of the differences in the nature of the embryo 
before and after, but because a sufficiently large plurality of reasonable moral 
arguments could be made in favor of protecting the embryo at this stage.  Whereas 
the AFS committee had treated the transition from preembryo to embryo as a 
decisive change in kind that was given in nature, the Panel approached 
embryogenesis as a continuum, and the scientific demarcation of stages more as 
function of judgment than of observation.   In this respect, it saw biological 
description as analogous to moral judgment; both were intended to lend order to 
complex phenomena.49  The question, then, was whether a given judgment ordered 
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things in a reasonable way.  Because the judgment about moral status was a public 
policy matter, HERP argued, no single argument could be decisive so long as there 
was public disagreement.  Moreover, moral intuitions differ about the biological 
precondition for personhood.  Therefore, instead of a single criterion like genetic 
uniqueness or individuation, the panel took into account “a variety of distinct, 
intersecting, and mutually supporting considerations.”50  The key concept here was 
the notion of the “reasonable.”  Here, the Panel leaned on an idea of public reason 
developed by the American political theorist and moral philosopher John Rawls.  
Citing Rawls, the report stated that: “Public policy employs reasoning that is 
understandable in terms that are independent of a particular religious, theological, 
or philosophical perspective, and it requires a weighing of arguments in the light of 
the best available information and scientific knowledge.”51 
Guided by Rawls’ notion of public reason, HERP set about to determine what 
(and whose) arguments met this test.  The Panel took on an arbitrational role, 
judging moral arguments not on their merits, but on their reasonableness.  If the 
Panel thought reasonable people would find an argument convincing, it was given 
greater weight.  This was based on the Panel’s imagination of the reasonable 
person, not on public consultation.  In fact, the Panel specifically did not invite 
input from the public.  Instead, the Panel made a judgment about what kinds of 
reasons people ought to agree upon.  And here they agreed with the AFS 
committee: scientific reasons are common to everyone, at least to everyone who is 
reasonable.  
The Panel treated accounts that invoked scientific evidence as closer to public 
reasons—closer to the sorts of reasons that reasonable minds by definition will 
agree upon.  HERP thus narrowed the sorts of moral arguments that had to be taken 
into account in public deliberation.  The Panel drew the circle of reasonable 
pluralism, and placed science at the center.    
The moral views that made it into the circle were those that most directly 
corresponded with scientific evidence.  In weighing arguments, the Panel privileged 
those that it thought could be challenged only through recourse to background 
moral and religious beliefs, or, in Rawls’ terms, “comprehensive doctrines.”  
Conversely, it excluded arguments that it deemed to depend on comprehensive 
doctrines, particularly religious ones.  For instance, the Panel claimed that the 
theological belief that the embryo is ensouled at fertilization is unreasonable 
because the individual is definitively present only at gastrulation—before that the 
embryo can split into two.52  Conversely, the belief that the embryo is not a person 
until after the formation of the primitive streak is reasonable, because it is justified 
by reference to universal and incontestable scientific reasons, not controverted 
theological ones.53  The Panel treated accounts that invoked scientific evidence as 
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closer to public reasons—closer to the sorts of reasons that reasonable minds would 
find intelligible and compelling.  Thus, whereas the AFS committee privileged 
scientific authority on technocratic grounds, the Panel offered a democratic theory 
that positioned science as an exemplar of reasonableness, and a measure against 
which to judge other kinds of reasons.  
 In this way, the Panel positioned itself as a judge of reasons and arbiter of the 
community of judgment.  It positioned itself as standing in for the public by 
performing public reason, by balancing those reasons it deemed reasonable until 
preponderance tipped the scale.  By considering only those reasons it deemed to be 
publicly reasonable, it likewise assumed the role of safeguarding the rational 
integrity and political legitimacy of judgment.  
This idea of public reason also shaped how the Panel engaged the public.  It 
tended to exclude non-expert voices.  From early in its deliberations the panel was 
convinced that the majority of Americans did not understand the issues well enough 
to hold reasonable positions, so there was no need to solicit public input.  It used 
public ignorance and the idea of public reason to justify its representational role.  
When critics objected that the Panel membership was personally biased toward 
permitting embryo research, Panel members agreed, but denied that this 
undermined the Panel’s legitimacy.  They argued that the Panel nevertheless 
represented the public because its job was to reason on behalf of the public, not to 
embody public disagreement in its various factions.  The Panel could stand in for 
the public by doing the sort of reasoning that the politics in the public square had 
failed to do.  In this sense, the Panel saw itself as closer to an ideally reasonable 
deliberative community than could ever be achieved in the public square.  By 
stepping in as an arbiter of public reasons, the Panel constructed an authoritative 
space for ethical experts—experts who did not necessarily know better than the 
citizen, but who could reason on the citizen’s behalf.   
 HERP recommended that research on left-over IVF embryos be permitted prior 
to gastrulation, and that embryos be created specifically for research purposes under 
certain circumstances.  In December of 1994, NIH director Harold Varmus 
endorsed these recommendations.  Shortly thereafter, Congress passed legislation 
banning federal funding for any research in which a human embryo is harmed or 
destroyed.  An appropriations bill rider known as the Dickey-Wicker Amendment 
placed embryos in the regulatory category of human subjects, sidestepping the 
ontological question by employing an existing ethical and legally defined category.  
But things quickly become ontologically murky once again following two key 
scientific developments: Dolly the cloned sheep in 1997, and the derivation of 




The National Bioethics Advisory Commission (“NBAC”) was created by the 
executive order of President Clinton in 1995.  After scientists announced that they 
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had successfully cloned a sheep using an adult somatic cell, Clinton called upon 
NBAC to assess the ethics of human cloning.54  He also called upon the 
Commission to examine issues associated with human embryonic stem cell research 
after embryonic stem cells were cultured by researchers at the University of 
Wisconsin in late 1998.55    
 NBAC’s approach reflected the procedural and principlist elements of 
professional bioethics, but as a public body it also acknowledged the plurality of 
moral approaches represented in the American polity.  To accommodate the fact of 
pluralism, the Commission undertook to translate pluralistic particularities into 
democratic universals.  As Commissioner Charo explained to the House 
Subcommittee on Health and Environment, NBAC would solicit the “widest 
possible range of views so that no aspect of public sentiment is left unexplored.”56  
By mobilizing the full range of American pluralism, the commission promised to 
represent every citizen while also locating premises held in common beneath 
pluralistic disagreement.  According to Commissioner Tom Murray, public 
deliberation would benefit from encountering the “strongest representations” of 
differing positions on cloning.57  In practice, this meant soliciting religious views.  
Representatives of a range of religions were brought in to testify and were told to 
speak in explicitly theological terms.   
NBAC differed from HERP not only in what sort of input it sought, but how it 
understood that input.  While HERP had privileged reasons that were grounded in 
science, NBAC treated all disagreement over embryo research as moral 
disagreement.  NBAC’s equalizing move created an important asymmetry.  
Whereas HERP had subjected all claims to the same test of reasonableness, NBAC 
treated scientific and moral questions as epistemologically separate, and therefore 
as belonging to a distinct sphere of authority. 
The Commission thus ignored competing ontological representations.  This was 
significant, because recent scientific developments had generated significant 
controversy over the biological status of its ambiguous, new artifacts.  For example, 
just after scientists reported that they had succeeded in culturing human embryonic 
stem cells, the New York Times reported a bizarre experiment conducted by 
Advanced Cell Technologies (“ACT”), a small biotechnology company.  An ACT-
supported researcher had transferred human somatic cell nuclei into bovine oocytes, 
producing several cleavage stage “embryos” from which cells were derived and 
cultured.   
The company’s stated intention in making the experiments public was to test 
the “public acceptability” of the research.  Finding that the results were insufficient 
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to warrant publication in a scientific journal, the company decided that it “was in 
the public interest to release the preliminary results to promote an informed and 
reasoned public discussion of the issues.”58   
The announcement elicited anxiety from numerous quarters.  Many observed 
that this ontologically ambiguous, boundary-crossing entity had complicated 
processes of ethical sense-making as well.  Glenn McGee, a professor of bioethics 
at the University of Pennsylvania, declared that ACT had created an ontological 
ambiguity that would not make things any easier for ethicists.  “What this whole 
business shows is that we are in a regulatory nightmare[.] . . . It’s going to be 
impossible to state whether these things are really human, let alone how to protect 
them.”59  Nicholas Wade of the New York Times noted, “[a] perplexing feature of 
the hybrid embryo would be that it would start mostly bovine, then become mostly 
yet not entirely human.”60  A “deeply troubled” President Clinton requested that the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission consider the implications of ACT’s 
research and report back within the week.61   
  The ACT experiment challenged the categories that underwrote NBAC’s 
strong distinction between ontological and ethical evaluation.  Using the law’s 
familiar mode of analogical reasoning, Commissioner and lawyer R. Alta Charo 
suggested that “part of the analysis that one would want to develop for the President 
could focus on what this fused cell is most like that we already know.  Is it most 
like two non-gametic cells that are fused, or is it most like a regular human embryo, 
or is it most like something else?”  Stanford geneticist David Cox supplied an 
authoritative answer: “It’s new, Alta, is what it is.”  Yet in its response to President 
Clinton, the Commission expressed uncertainty about the ACT experiment while at 
once affirming that a clear (scientifically authoritative) classification was an 
obligatory passage point into ethical analysis.  According to NBAC, it was unclear 
whether the “construct” was an embryo, by which they meant “an organism . . . 
which has the potential, if transferred to a uterus, to develop in the normal course of 
events into a living human being.”62  If it was, it raised “complex and controversial” 
concerns.63  If not, the research raised no new ethical issues.64   
By punting on the question of who is responsible for saying what a biological 
entity is, the Commission sidestepped the very problem of ontological politics that 
had given rise to the problem of “moral status” in the first place.  On NBAC’s view, 
ethical analysis could proceed without resolving the status of the entity because 
legitimate democratic disagreement was, by definition, disagreement over questions 
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of values.  Ontological and normative questions were, therefore, subject to two very 
different institutions: science and democracy respectively.  The process of 
answering fact questions belonged to a different deliberative community employing 
different criteria of evaluation.  Each could proceed independently of the other, with 
their respective results ultimately linked together in forming policy.   
By erecting a strong boundary between science and democracy, the 
Commission was able to attribute all public disagreement to the fact of reasonable 
pluralism.  Rather than simply exclude (putatively) theologically informed 
ontological accounts from the mix as the Human Embryo Research Panel had, 
NBAC took the opposite tack.  It treated accounts of what the embryo is as 
primarily moral (and theological) and secondarily epistemic.  Put differently, the 
Commission judged that if ontological questions were important in ethical debates, 
it was only because some system of values had attached particular meanings to 
them.  These meanings could be dissociated from the ontological questions, and 
treated as yet one more moral account in the range of plural perspectives. 
Controversy over the embryo was a straightforward result of moral heterogeneity 
within the polity.  
By characterizing these ontological debates as covertly moral, NBAC bounded 
moral deliberation from ontological sense-making and separated problems of 
knowing accurately and reasoning well.  As one commissioner put it, “let’s stop 
staring at the embryo and looking for the source of its meaning,” and instead look 
“at its context in our lives, including how and why it was brought into creation.”65  
Representing the embryo meant uncovering the pluralistic moral representations of 
the embryo, and exposing whatever common principles lay beneath them.  The 
disagreements that the AFS committee expected to resolve through technocratic 
clarification of ontological confusion, NBAC treated as moral disagreement by 
other means.  Moral status ceased to be a problem of how to relate to the embryo, 
and instead became a problem of how to relate one person’s moral convictions to 
the next’s.  
Thus, the Commission abandoned the search for consensus in an ontological 
account of what an embryo is, and instead gathered the “input of a group of 
religious scholars from diverse faith traditions whose views within and across 
traditions reflected the diversity found within the public as a whole.”66  Indeed, the 
commission instructed witnesses who were meant to represent religious 
perspectives to speak in explicitly theological terms.  Bioethicist Gilbert Meilander 
was asked to represent a Protestant perspective, even though his scholarship was 
disciplinarily closer to bioethics than to Protestant theology.  He noted that, 
although he had been directed to speak in explicitly theological terms, he could 
have made very similar arguments without drawing on Protestant theology in any 
way.  Lisa Cahill was asked to present a Catholic perspective.  She too assumed a 
theological idiom, but noted that NBAC’s boundary construction enforced an 
artificial distinction between theological and secular (including scientific) 
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reasoning.  She noted that many of the Catholic arguments were grounded more in 
natural law theory than in Catholic dogma.   
This strategy appears to be at odds with the ideas of public reasoning and 
democratic legitimacy that the Commission endorsed.  It wrote, “an appropriate 
approach to public policy in this area is to develop policies that demonstrate respect 
for all reasonable alternative points of view and that focus, when possible, on the 
shared fundamental values that these divergent opinions, in their own ways, seek to 
affirm.”67  In seeking religious perspectives, it was soliciting reasons that diverged 
rather than converged on “shared fundamental values.”  NBAC resolved this 
contradiction through three related ideas of representation.  First, it treated religious 
accounts as the furthest removed from overlapping consensus in public views.  By 
capturing the diversity of religious views, the full range of moral views held by “the 
public as a whole” were adequately represented.  These views constituted a kind of 
snapshot of raw (pre-reasonable) pluralism.  Views expressed in terms of 
“comprehensive doctrines” captured the forms of divergent disagreement that had 
not taken any steps toward translation into public reasons.  Second, as noted above, 
it segregated representations of facts from representations of values by treating 
ontological disagreements as value-interpretations.  Third, it positioned itself as 
serving a particular kind of representational role by performing public reasoning on 
the public’s behalf.  Its aim was to discover an incipient overlapping consensus in 
the picture of divergent disagreement that it had assembled.  It assumed that 
overlapping consensus was possible, but the public had failed to achieve it on its 
own because it was not adequately committed to (or capable of) finding the “shared 
fundamental values that these divergent opinions, in their own ways, seek to 
affirm.”  This third representational move depended upon the other two.  By 
soliciting reasons that demonstrably failed the test of being “acknowledged by all as 
reasons,”68 on the one hand, and designating ontological questions as being 
beyond—and irrelevant to—its remit, it marked out the boundaries of appropriately 
public reasons.  The problem of society’s relationship to the embryo, and the 
corollary question of its moral status, gave way to an ontology of public reason.  In 
effect, the moral problem of moral status became dissociated from the embryo as an 
entity in the world.   
In soliciting theological perspectives, NBAC made two key assumptions.  First, 
it treated the distinction between fact and value as epistemologically unproblematic.  
This is remarkable not only in light of the ontologically ambiguous entities 
discussed above, but also because most of the witnesses grounded their ethical 
accounts of how the embryo should be treated in accounts of what the embryo is 
and in notions of what biological features they considered relevant to moral 
judgments.  In short, ethical evaluations tended to be grounded in (somewhat 
divergent) ontological accounts.  By drawing a strong boundary between fact and 
value, the Commission absolved itself of having to deal with the problem of the 
right relationship between scientific authority and democratic authority.  Public 
moral sense-making then became a procedural matter of reconciling the range of 
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views that liberal democracy permitted.   
Second, it assumed that, where there is agreement on matters of fact among 
experts, public disagreements must necessarily be over values, even if couched as 
disagreements over matters of fact.   Therefore, to bring all moral views out into the 
open, it would be necessary to translate disagreements on matters of fact into a 
values idiom.  As a result, the authority of competing claims would be grounded in 
nothing beyond the right of individuals to hold their own moral and religious views.  
With these assumptions NBAC set out to analyze and mediate moral 
disagreement.  It assumed the role of translating religious (nonpublic) reasons into 
secular, ethical (public) reasons in order to bring them in line with the rules of 
public reason.  The Commission’s Stem Cell Report quoted political theorists 
Dennis Thompson and Amy Gutmann: “[T]he construction of public policy on 
morally controversial matters should involve a ‘search for significant points of 
convergence between one’s own understandings and those of citizens whose 
positions, taken in their more comprehensive forms, one must reject.’”69  For 
Gutmann and Thomspon, this is a normative requirement of democratic deliberation 
and policy formation.  Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, a procedural means is 
required to move from disagreement to democratically legitimate resolution.  The 
ideal means, they argue, is robust deliberation in which imbalances in political 
power and understanding are neutralized.  Therefore, everyone must adhere to 
certain norms of engagement in the public square.  The most important norm is 
“reciprocity.”  The principle of reciprocity requires that “[w]hen citizens make 
moral claims in a deliberative democracy, they appeal to reasons or principles that 
can be shared by fellow citizens . . . .”70  These reasons should be “recognizably 
moral in form and mutually acceptable in content.”71  A claim fails the test of 
reciprocity when “it imposes a requirement on other citizens to adopt one’s 
sectarian way of life as a condition of gaining access to the moral understanding 
that is essential to judging the validity of one’s moral claims.”  In keeping with 
Rawls as discussed above, Gutmann and Thompson briefly note that another 
element of reciprocity is the “plausibility” of fact claims.72 
The Commission sought as “wide a set of views as possible,” and discerned the 
“points of convergence” between these views.  It translated reasons that were closed 
to general moral understanding—explicitly theological reasons, for example—into 
reasons that “could be shared by fellow citizens.”  The role of the public bioethics 
body, as NBAC saw it, was to translate nonpublic (i.e., religious) reasons into a 
secular, ideologically neutral, normative idiom that could, as far as possible, unify 
the moral pluralism of the American public.  NBAC, like HERP before it, drew a 
Rawlsian distinction between public and nonpublic reasons.  The Commission 
maintained that for public policy to be legitimate, it had to be grounded in “the 
shared fundamental values that . . . [all reasonable alternative points of view] in 
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their own ways, seek to affirm.”73  “Reasonable” here meant simply that a moral 
position could be translated into a common, secular currency.  For NBAC, the 
appropriate limits of pluralistic representation corresponded with the limits to 
translation: public policy should incorporate only those positions that can be 
translated into generic, common principles. 
In discussion, Commissioners tended to distinguish between the “religious” and 
the “ethical,” which meant nonpublic and public reasons respectively.  Certain 
Commissioners repeatedly commented on the difficulties of translating the former 
into the latter.  Translation became a gate-keeping device; if Commissioners could 
not come up with what they thought was a reasonable translation of a theological 
claim, they excluded it.  During the cloning deliberations, Tom Murray said,  
I was one of the people . . . who repeatedly asked the religiously-oriented 
thinkers at our last meeting if they could also try to state their concerns in 
ways that would be accessible to those who did not necessarily share all 
their faith commitments.  I am going to continue to do that because it is 
one thing to say that we should respect your belief just because you hold 
this belief deeply, and I think we should respect those beliefs, but it is 
difficult to know exactly what to do with that when one comes to making 
public policy.74  
For NBAC, translation from religious to secular reasons was not a matter of 
merely scratching out references to God and seeing whether the resulting sentence 
was still coherent.  It was a means for transforming half-formed moral declarations 
into rationally coherent arguments that abided by the rules of public reason, 
including in particular, rational consistency.  Sometimes this meant uncovering 
putatively tacit elements of a moral position—elements that the proponent of that 
position would not necessarily recognize as his or her own.  For instance, the stem 
cell report leaned on an argument from philosopher Ronald Dworkin about 
abortion.  Dworkin argued that few anti-abortion Americans genuinely believe that 
the conceptus is a person.75  Those who accept abortion in cases of rape or incest, 
for instance, hold moral positions that are inconsistent with a position of fetal 
personhood.76  Since anyone engaged in public moral deliberation is bound by a 
commitment to consistency, the only way to resolve this apparent inconsistency is 
to recognize that the anti-abortionist is in reality open to balancing harm to the fetus 
against other harms or goods.77  NBAC treated this discovery of openness to 
balancing as a “shared view” of proponents and opponents of embryo research.78  
On this basis, NBAC concluded that since most defenders of nascent human life 
were unwittingly open to balancing protection of the embryo against other goods, 
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destruction of embryos is permissible to secure compelling therapeutic benefits.  
The Committee described this conclusion as a “reasonable statement of the kind of 
agreement that could be possible.”79   
 Thus under NBAC, the public ethics body became an organ of democratic 
deliberation grafted onto the body of existing American institutions to rectify a new 
kind of failure in the public square: the failure to reason properly about a morally 
complex technical domain.  By assuming this role as guardian of public reasoning 
and applying its rational acuity to problems of pluralistic disagreement, NBAC 
would nurture moral arguments beyond the limits of the citizen’s own philosophical 
faculties and produce ideally democratic deliberation without relying on the polity 
itself to do the deliberating.  Yet equally noteworthy is the kind of reasoning that 
NBAC imagined to be ideal.  NBAC in effect made itself a moral calculating 
machine.  It defined the rules of the game by operationalizing the norms of public 
reason.  Democracy would be achieved through a kind of philosophical-
bureaucratic commensuration of (pre-reasonable) values claims by subjecting them 
to tests of internal consistency and translatability into a common, secular idiom.  Its 
approach was predicated on the notion that facts and values are self-evidently 
distinct, and are subject to completely separate regimes of justification.  The 
consequence was that the ontological—and moral—ambiguity of the material world 
was removed from the calculative picture.  The subject of moral deliberation ceased 
to be the instrumental use of the human embryo, and became the mechanical 
extraction of legitimately democratic moral principles from the public’s (nonpublic) 
reasoning.  Knowing what was right in the light of public reason was artificially 
severed from the problem of right knowledge of things in the world.  And the 
authority to declare what a thing is such that society’s oughts could be made to 
apply to it was thereby delegated to science.   
 It is worth noting, therefore, that NBAC’s calculative process was organized by 
a balancing test whose parameters were defined by science.  In weighing public 
moral concerns against promised scientific benefits, it deferred to scientific 
imaginations of plausible technological futures.  It asymmetrically subjected public 
concerns to critical scrutiny without similarly questioning scientific imaginations of 
the future and the visions of the good with which they are inflected.  Indeed, on 
NBAC’s dogmatic demarcation between matters of fact and matters of value, it is 
not clear how such symmetrical scrutiny could be undertaken.  But given the 
profoundly powerful role that science plays in public moral sense-making by virtue 
of its authority to declare what is and to predict what shall be, this very fact 




It is commonplace to mark science and technology’s extraordinary powers over 
life with the epithet of revolution.  “Biological revolution” evokes rupture and 
transformation, a discontinuity between life as we know it and our lives to come.  
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Yet revolution is a political concept.  This Article has argued that the biological 
revolution is wrought as much in the laboratories of democracy as in the 
experimental spaces of technoscience.  New biotechnologies have disturbed 
fundamental but delicate formations in the landscape of collective life; rendering 
urgent the question of by what criteria we will determine inclusion in the moral 
community.  As this Article has demonstrated, those criteria are at once ontological 
and political: our ethical postures toward the human at the boundaries of life are 
refracted through the circle of politics and in the imaginations of reason that 
inscribe it.   
I have followed the “idea of public reason” as a construct in democratic theory 
into arenas of political practice where fundamental dimensions of human life—
biological and political—are at stake.  I have argued that the idea of public reason, 
deployed in these contexts, was used to discipline public discourse according to 
criteria that were not democratically derived.  Drawing upon the authority of 
science as a source of incontestable reasons, public bioethics bodies narrowed the 
forms of disagreement and the range of reasons that they would recognize as 
appropriately public, relegating to the domains of nonpublic reasons moral 
imaginations that would not easily conform to declared distinctions between fact 
and value, secular and religious.  I have argued that these bodies positioned 
themselves as legitimately standing in for the public by claiming to represent public 
reason, disciplining democracy and silencing public voices in the name of the self-
same democratic public.  
These bodies represent only a few modest experiments in democracy’s wide 
laboratory.  But they are sites where we can see modernity’s powerful imaginaries 
touch down and develop in novel forms and directions.  They are moments where 
the vernacular of public reason is refined and altered, and where the basic 
normative vocabularies that regulate the democratic imagination take on altered 
meanings.  I have argued that the boundaries between the secular and the religious, 
and between the ontological and the normative—boundaries that the idea of public 
reason takes as given in advance—were refined and reconstructed in these 
moments.   
These were moments of secularization, but as such were expressions of agency 
and imagination, not of some logic of historical progress that inhabits our 
institutions.  Secularization, like its cousin concept scientific progress, is too readily 
naturalized to an imaginary of modernity’s inevitable forward march.  Yet when we 
look closely at the practices of the institutions that are ostensibly shaped by these 
overarching logics, we see that these logics are, in fact, enacted in the practices of 
these very institutions.  Understanding how they are enacted, and in deference to 
what under-scrutinized imaginations, therefore becomes an urgent task.  One 
critical element of this task is to attend to the remarkable absence of science in 
contemporary theories of politics.   
The institution of science is perhaps the defining achievement of secular 
modernity.  If we refuse to take modernity’s defining categories as natural and 
given in advance, we must look also to the forms of power that reside with this 
institution.  To this end, we must attend to the constructions of reason that define 
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the social contract between science and democracy, and to the constitutional 
position of science in arenas of collective moral sense-making.  
Imagining public reason is a problem for—and a privilege of—democracy.  In 
the cases examined in this essay, the idea of public reason was wielded as a device 
of exclusion, weeding out those voices that spoke in an unsanctioned idiom and 
disciplining moral imaginations into a homogenized false pluralism.  An exercise of 
power was undertaken in the name of freedom and equality.  Yet the reservoir of 
authority that was drawn upon to this end is not in the conventional pantheon of 
institutional power.  Therefore, the exercise of exclusion is not easily recognized as 
such.  In our collective imagination, the institution of science seems to sit outside 
the arena of politics.  Science is called upon to assume responsibility for forms of 
complexity, ambiguity and disagreement that we would rather not have to shoulder 
as a society, that we would rather have spoken by the faceless authority of the fact 
than through our own, far less powerful, far less univocal, but far more personal 
voices.   
To the persistent fact of reasonable pluralism, science seems to offer a univocal 
view from nowhere, and thus a powerful resource for contending with disagreement 
by reducing the range of reasons which democracy must entertain.  Yet at its most 
fundamental level, the purpose of deliberative politics is not merely to ground the 
exercise of power in robust procedures of collective judgment, although this is a 
venerable aim.  Its most profound promise lies in the commitment to respect and 
harness the richness of collective moral imagination “lest one good custom should 
corrupt the world.”80  The challenge, then, is to recognize reason itself as inhabiting 
the practices, institutions and imaginations whereby we arrive at accounts we deem 
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